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Abstract
Social assistance to the poor is increasingly subject to compulsory work
requirements in Germany. Municipalities have started to offer temporary
employment in their job-creation companies to claimants who are able to
work. These claimants earn wages and social insurance contributions if they
accept the offer, but lose social assistance if they reject it. Further savings to
local funds arise from the fact that when a worker’s temporary employment
ends, he or she is entitled to federal unemployment benefits which involve no
costs for the municipality. The paper analyses this vertical fiscal externality
and shows that in the long run, municipalities tend to employ a suboptimal
number of welfare recipients in their companies.
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1.  Introduction
The dramatic rise in unemployment in Germany since the early 1990s has created a crisis in the
social assistance program, which is the lowest layer in the German social safety net. Those
mainly affected by this crisis are the municipalities, which are responsible for most social
security measures outside the social insurance system. Social assistance expenditures are
primarily financed by the municipalities themselves, which do not receive public compensation
from the central government as a strict application of the "principle of connexity"
(Konnexitätsprinzip) would imply. The principle of connexity requires that the delegation of
tasks by the federal government have to be accompanied by sufficient federal funds. As a
consequence, municipal budgets are becoming seriously depleted by social assistance
expenditures, and the scope for local expenditure programs has been reduced. The call for a
comprehensive reform of local government finance has been largely ignored and consequently
an increasing number of local governments have started to help themselves by looking for
novel ways of restoring their financial independence.
Some municipalities have started to replace the existing social assistance system, in
which payments are made unconditionally to all welfare recipients, by a mutual contract in
which welfare payments are granted only conditional upon a service rendered in return by the– 2 –
recipient.
1 In practice, municipalities now pay social assistance only to those welfare recipients
who are either willing to work or unable to do so. Municipalities such as Leipzig, Frankfurt
and Lübeck have started to offer social transfer recipients temporary employment in
municipality-owned job-creation companies (so-called ”Beschäftigungsgesellschaften”) in
which they are paid a wage income and have social insurance contributions paid on their
behalf. Welfare recipients who turn down such a job offer lose their welfare payments.
The municipalities profit from this change in the social assistance system in several
ways. Firstly, the output produced in the local job-creation company increases the amount of
publicly provided goods. Secondly, municipalities save on social assistance payments in the
short run for all claimants who are able but not willing to work, since these persons lose their
entitlements to social assistance transfers. Thirdly, the local authorities save social assistance
payments in the long run for those who become temporarily employed in the job-creation
company. After having been employed for a year, each worker acquires claims to federal
unemployment benefits which the "Bundesanstalt für Arbeit" – a federal, rather than a local,
authority – has to pay after the temporary employment contract ends. However, these long-
term savings for communities create additional expenditures for the federal government
agency. Hence, for the economy as a whole they are not savings but a cost-shifting from the
local to the federal government. This vertical fiscal externality caused by the system of social
assistance in Germany is the subject of the present paper.
The growing need for German municipalities to look for new ways of reducing their
social assistance expenditures is discussed in the next section, which reviews their financial
situation. Section 3 presents a case study of Leipzig, which has found a way out of its financial
crisis by establishing a local job-creation company. A formal model showing the conditions
under which such an institution is advantageous for a municipality and the economic
consequences it has is presented in Section 4. The final section comments on recent proposals
for the reform of the system of social assistance and unemployment insurance in Germany.
                                               
1  See Rosenfeld (1997) for a discussion of the circumstances under which such contracts are justifiable.– 3 –
2. Some aims and problems of municipal job-creation companies
2.1.  The financial crisis of the municipalities
The structure of the German social security system assigns an unenviable role to the
municipalities. The federal law concerning social assistance (Bundessozialhilfegesetz, BSHG)
regulates the content and extent of transfers to the poor. Although the BSHG assigns
responsibility for implementing the program to state and municipal governments, the latter
enjoy very little autonomy in making decisions regarding admission to the program or in
designing program features. Welfare programs are mainly financed by state governments,
which in turn can determine the extent to which the municipalities also have to make a financial
contribution.
2 The only financial contribution made by the federal government is to the
payments for immigrants, refugees, and Germans living abroad. In short, the law is defined by
the federal government, but its execution and financing is the responsibility of state and, in
particular, municipal governments.
The sharp increase in social assistance expenditures over the last two decades has
brought the financial situation of municipalities close to the point of disaster. The expenditures
on regular social assistance (”Laufende Hilfe zum Lebensunterhalt”), which is granted to
households if their income or wealth is not sufficient to cover subsistence, amounted to 20.2
billion deutschmarks in 1997. This was more than four times the level of 1980. By comparison,
total local expenditures have risen only about 92% in the same period. Figure 1 shows the
timing of this process as well as the significance of the problem for local government finance.
3
                                               
2 States provided one-third and municipalities two-thirds of social assistance expenditures in 1993 (see also
Klanberg and Prinz, 1984). Wieland (1996) points to a gap in the German fiscal constitution concerning the
relationship between the federal government and the municipalities which leads to a delegation of tasks by the
federal government which are not accompanied by sufficient federal funds, as the principle of connexity (see
e.g. Biehl, 1996) would require.
3 For a concise description of this development, see Deutsche Bundesbank (1996) and Seitz and Kurz (1998).– 4 –















Notes: Expenditures on regular social assistance (Laufende Hilfe zum Lebensunterhalt) are the share of total social
assistance expenditures (44.4 bn deutschmarks in 1997) which is mainly borne by municipalities. By definition, they do not
include expenditures on assistance in special situations (Hilfe in besonderen Lebenslagen, which totalled 24.2 bn
deutschmarks in 1997). Total local expenditures consist of the aggregate expenditures of municipalities (Gemeinden and
Gemeindeverbände), including social assistance expenditures. The increase in total local expenditures in 1991 is mainly
due to German unification, which had a delayed effect on social assistance expenditures due to transitional provisions. The
index is normalized to 100 for 1980 in both time series.
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt: Fachserie 13, Sozialleistungen, Reihe 2, Sozialhilfe 1996; Statistisches Bundesamt:
Statistisches Jahrbuch, various volumes.
The various minor reforms of the past few years have had little success in slowing down the
rise in social assistance expenditures.
4 True, the explosion in expenditures has been contained
for individual assistance in special situations (”Hilfe in besonderen Lebenslagen”) such as
disability, which is mostly financed and administered by state-level organizations. For regular
social assistance, however, municipalities still have to cope with rapidly rising expenditures.
The main reason for this continual rise is the growing number of recipients. While in
1980, only 1.4% of the German population received regular social assistance, by the end of
1996 it was 3.3% or 2.7 million persons. This development can be ascribed mainly to the sharp
rise in unemployment. Strecker (1995, p. 267) reports an increase in the proportion of
                                               
4 The most important measures were the covering of the costs of care by the newly installed care insurance in
two stages in 1993 and 1997, the redefinition of grants to asylum seekers through the new ”Asylbewerber-
leistungsgesetz”, and the prolongation of the period in which long-term unemployment insurance payers who
then became unemployed are entitled to unemployment assistance.– 5 –
households receiving social assistance due to unemployment from 20.3% in 1983 to 30.3% in
1993. In absolute terms, this translates into 567,000 households containing a total of 911,000
persons (also see Hauser 1997, p. 524). This dramatic growth in expenditures on social
assistance has led municipalities to seek new ways out of their financial crises.
2.2. The Leipzig example: a case study of a job-creation company
The Leipzig social affairs department offers temporary employment in the municipality-owned
company ”Betrieb für Beschäftigungsförderung” (BfB) to every social assistance claimant who
is considered able to work.
5 If the claimant rejects the offer, his or her social assistance
entitlements are cut in three stages, until they are removed completely. If the claimant accepts
the offer, he or she receives a temporary one-year contract from the BfB. The contract
guarantees an average net income of about 1,400 deutschmarks per month. This salary is
higher than the social assistance payment, which is on average slightly below 1,000
deutschmarks, but it amounts to only about 80% of the wage of the lowest wage-group agreed
on for public servants.
6 The wage offered by the job-creation company rewards work, given
the threat to cut assistance otherwise,
7 and creates an entitlement to social insurance payments
in future. In addition, those who are willing to work enjoy some non-pecuniary advantages
such as a reduction in stigmatization as a jobless person and the (re-) learning of certain basic
skills essential for competing for ordinary jobs.
8 Workers in the job-creation company can also
                                               
5 In determining a person’s ability to work, the city of Leipzig makes use of the entire range of possibilities
defined by legislators in §19 and §20 of the BSHG. According to these paragraphs there is to be no recruitment
of people who are physically or mentally unable to work, in cases where recruitment would affect the education
of a child, and in those where it would significantly reduce the person's future ability to exercise a former long-
standing occupation.
6 In the BfB, wages are partially determined by the size of the workers's family, as is the case with the social
assistance level. This feature clearly marks the BfB as a charitable organization rather than a private
corporation.
7 It is not self-evident that social assistance recipients benefit from accepting a low paid job in the regular
labour market. In the current German system, the implicit marginal tax rate is still up to 100% for a wide range
of earned incomes, so that additional work effort has no attraction whatsoever; see Feist (1996).
8 See Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1995) and Gerlach and Stefan (1996).– 6 –
participate in its program for obtaining skills qualifications so that, over all, the chances of
finding an occupation on the regular job market should improve.
9
The BfB in Leipzig tries to adjust to the wishes and capabilities of individual claimants,
but the majority of jobs are physically demanding, unpleasant tasks, such as turning waste land
into building land, dredging the mud out of ponds, or removing toxic construction materials
from houses. The company has its own laundry, printing works, various workshops, a market
gardener, and a nursery.
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Source: Statements by the Betrieb für Beschäftigungsförderung, Leipzig, cited as in Kirbach (1997).
Figure 2 shows the situation in Leipzig before and after the establishment of the job-creation
company. The city systematically offered a job to each of the approximately 2,600 social
assistance recipients considered to be able to work. Of these, only 62% or about 1,600 persons
accepted the job offer.
10 The other 38% had to face a significant cut in social assistance or
                                               
9 However, in 1996 only 8% of the workers employed by the BfB managed to find an occupation in the regular
job market.
10 Although all social assistance recipients were offered a job in 1996 and all contracts were limited to one year,
the number of employees in September 1997 was still 1,400 persons. This can be explained by the fact that the
number of social assistance claimants grew by about 40% in 1997 due to the adverse labor market situation, the
end of transitional arrangements in the course of German unification, and a better understanding by the poor of
the options open to them (telephone information provided by the Leipzig social affairs department, October 21,
1998).– 7 –
even its discontinuation. For the city of Leipzig, the departure of so many welfare recipients
meant an immense fiscal surplus, out of which a non-negligible fraction of the employment
contracts, which are more expensive than pure welfare payments, could be financed.
11
Alas, this is not the entire story. The second half of the Leipzig saga cannot be found in
the brochures published by the municipal government. The city of Leipzig obtains much more
significant savings through this welfare program because all temporary workers in the job-
creation company cease to burden the coffers of the municipalities, either partially or wholly.
Having paid social security contributions for 360 calendar days, these workers are entitled first
to receive unemployment benefit payments for 156 calendar days at a level equal to 60-67% of
their previous net wage, and then – conditional on fulfilling requirements such as compulsory
registration with the federal government’s job agency, remaining available for employment,
working toward skills qualifications, etc. – to be paid indefinite unemployment assistance
amounting to 53-57% of their previous net wage. The former benefits are financed by social
insurance contributions, while the latter are administered by a federal agency and financed with
federal funds. In this way, benefit payments are shifted from the municipal to the federal
government. In cases such as this, local social assistance, as the safety net below
unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance, will only fill the gap up to the
subsistence level.
2.3. Fiscal consequences of a job-creation company
How should the economic consequences of a job-creation company be judged, if the burden-
shifting effect is taken into account? This question can hardly be analyzed adequately using
existing models in the economics literature on fiscal federalism. Most models of fiscal
expenditure externalities concentrate on what happens if individual municipalities can
                                               
11 The average social assistance transfer for single persons, of about 1,000 deutschmarks per month, disppears
for 38% of the 2,600 previous recipients, leading to savings of about 1 million deutschmarks. Labor costs have
to be paid for the 62% of the previous recipients who now receive wage income and for whom Leipzig has to
pay wage taxes and social security contributions. In total, Leipzig has to pay about 1,280 deutschmarks more
for a worker than it has to pay for welfare recipient. About half of the additional expenditures which amount to
2 million deutschmarks per year, can be compensated for through savings from vanishing recipients.– 8 –
independently determine the amount of money spent on a specific type of expenditure such as
social welfare payments. For these cases, it has been shown that local governments choose an
inefficiently low level of expenditures, since expenditures on local welfare programs attract
poor mobile households from other municipalities and drive rich households out of the home
municipality. This form of horizontal competition among jurisdictions is discussed in Musgrave
(1971), Brown and Oates (1987), Wildasin (1991) and Sinn (1994, 1997). However, within
Germany horizontal competition is of negligible importance since the German system of social
assistance is relatively homogeneous due to federal regulations. Even the creation of
municipality-owned job-creation companies will hardly lead to an increase in horizontal fiscal
competition, since the law provides that a municipality begins to pay for a welfare recipient
only two years after he or she has taken residence in this municipality (cf. §§ 97 and 107 of the
BSHG). Until then, the former home municipality remains responsible. Mobility costs for social
assistance recipients are sufficiently high so that the incentive to move in order to avoid
working in the job-creation program will be very low.
Spillovers from local expenditure decisions onto the federal budget, so-called vertical
expenditure externalities, are discussed hardly at all in the literature.
12 An analysis of recent
developments in local expenditure policy, such as the creation of municipality-owned job-
creation companies, and their repercussions on the federal budget, is entirely lacking. The
theoretical analysis which follows seeks to close this gap.
3. The fiscal consequences of establishing a job-creation company
In the following we consider a model of a federal system consisting of N ex ante identical
municipalities and one federal government. The task of the federal government is to levy taxes,
to pay unemployment benefits and unemployment assistance, and to forward the rest of the tax
revenues as a federal grant to the municipalities, who are not authorized to levy taxes on their
                                               
12 Exceptions are Wiegard (1980), Dahlby (1996) and Wrede (1997).– 9 –
own.
13 The federal government therefore redistributes income from workers to the unemployed
on the one hand, and among different municipalities on the other.
3.1. A basic model of social assistance
Each individual municipality is granted a given budget Z which it may use to finance social
assistance expenditures or to provide a local public good G.
14 The number of poor people
living in each municipality is exogeneously given as S. This number is assumed to be the same
for all n municipalities. These poor people are in principle able to work, but are nevertheless
entitled to social assistance and receive an annual welfare benefit bn. The budget restriction of
municipality n is therefore given by
S b G Z n n i + = . (1)
The amount of welfare benefit bn can – within certain limits – be determined independently by
each individual municipality. However, the municipality has to guarantee at least a socio-
cultural subsistence income level m, a provision guaranteed by the German constitution (see
Bundesverfassungsgericht, 1992), i.e. b m n ‡ .
The local government maximizes the utility of the median voter in the municipality,
who is assumed to be a worker. Since no local taxes are levied, the utility of the median voter
can only be influenced by the provision of a public good.
15
                                               
13 The institutional arrangements of the German system are simplified in this model. All tasks of the
intermediate layer of government, that of the states, are assumed to be performed by the federal government.
The model also disregards any possibility of municipalities levying taxes on their own.
14 This assumption implies that the “principle of connexity” does not play a role in social assistance. See
Wieland (1996), as well as Münstermann (1998), for state-specific regulations concerning inter-governmental
grants.
15 If a municipality could finance the provision of the public good through municipal taxes it would raise its tax
rate until the marginal rate of substitution of private consumption through the public good equalled the
marginal cost of public good provision (including the excess burden resulting from the municipal tax). In this
case the median voter also has an interest in minimizing the welfare benefit payments to the poor because this
keeps his or her municipal taxes low and the provision of the public good high.– 10 –
From (1) it follows that the municipality will provide welfare benefits exactly at the
federally legislated socio-cultural subsistence level, b m n = , in order to maximize the amount of
the local public good. Municipal expenditures for the local public good then amount to
mS Z Gn - = . (2)
This is a very stylized description of the existing German social assistance system. By
establishing a job-creation company, however, Leipzig has demonstrated that the main tasks of
social assistance can effectively be taken over by a system in which only the willingness to
work guarantees an entitlement to further financial assistance.
3.2. Modelling the job-creation company
To investigate whether the Leipzig model represents a viable alternative to the current system
of social assistance, we again examine the calculus of a representative municipality which takes
the federal grant Z as given. The local government can decide either to maintain the current
system or to establish a local job-creation company and make social assistance dependent on
claimants’ willingness to work. If a job-creation company is set up, the local government has
then to decide how many workers it wants to employ in each period. While first-year
employment is determined by hiring only, from the second year on the level of employment can
be influenced both by hiring some of the remaining social assistance claimants who are not yet
employed and by laying off workers who were employed in the previous year.
By dismissing workers after one year, the municipality gets rid of any future welfare
payments to these workers, because these workers have acquired entitlements to federal-
budget unemployment benefit and assistance. The municipality derives an additional advantage
from establishing a job-creation company. If a claimant rejects the offer of work, he or she is
no longer entitled to social assistance. Hence, the local government gains an instrument for
sorting out those claimants who are not necessarily dependent on public assistance. Since only
a proportion  1 £ a  of social assistance recipients take up work, but all claimants who were– 11 –
offered a job lose their welfare benefit m, the savings per employee of the job-creation
company exceed the welfare benefit per recipient by  a 1 .
The local government maximizes the utility of the median voter by maximizing the local
public good G given the budget restriction. Welfare benefit and net wage in the job-creation
company are therefore set to the federally legislated socio-cultural subsistence income level.
But the operation of the job-creation company involves some additional costs for the
municipality, such as social insurance contributions, wage taxes and the costs of providing the
workplace. In the following, total expenditures of the company per worker are denoted as the
gross wage w.
To fill positions in its job-creation company, each year t the municipality offers a job
toH t ( )of the social assistance recipients.
16 A proportion aH t ( ) of the recipients will accept
the job offer and start working in the job-creation company.
17 A proportion ( ) 1-a  will reject
the offer and loses its entitlement.
18 For a <1, therefore, the work requirement serves as a
selection mechanism which ensures that only really needy persons obtain public assistance.
19
The greater ( ) 1-a , the greater is the cost-saving effect for the local budget when additional
recipients are offered a job.
The number of employees in the job-creation company in year t is defined as  B t ( ). In
the start-up phase of the company, the number of employees depends only on the number of
recipients H( ) 1  asked to work in the first year, and on the acceptance rate a:
) 1 ( ) 1 ( H B a = . (3)
                                               
16 In principle, the municipality could also ask the recipients of unemployment assistance to work in its job-
creation company. This case is neglected here because the local government would always prefer hiring a social
assistance recipient to hiring an unemployment benefit recipient because of the future cost savings at the
expense of the federal budget, which the municipality would enjoy in the former case but not in the latter case.
17 As shown in Section 2, for Leipzig the proportion of those who accept a job offer is  62 . 0 = a . Strecker
(1995, p. 269) reports that in the city of Cologne, out of 5,000 social assistance recipients who were offered
work, only 77 persons rejected the offer. The proportion of persons willing to work in Cologne therefore was
98 . 0 = a .
18 The instantaneous loss of all entitlements is a simplification. In Leipzig, welfare benefits are cut in two
stages of 25%, and only if a third offer is rejected is the benefit payment set to zero.
19 See the Anglo-American literature on the question of workfare versus welfare, e.g. Besley and Coate (1992),
Dye and Antle (1986), Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982), and Zeckhauser (1971).– 12 –




1 ) ( , on the acceptance rate a, and on the dismissals which the company can carry
out from the second year on, ￿
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In the local job-creation company, the local public good G is produced with technology
f B t ( ( )), for which we make the common assumptions  f B t '( ( )) > 0,  f B t ''( ( )) < 0,
0 ) 0 ( ' >> f , and  lim ' ( ( ))




3.3. Two preliminaries on the choice of system
Two preliminary considerations allow us to reduce to a minimum the analytical apparatus
necessary for explaining the maximization calculus of the municipality. First, it is immediately
clear that it is worthwhile for the municipality to hire a new worker as long as his or her
marginal product  f' exceeds the gross wage w. After the municipality has shifted all former
local social assistance recipients over to the federal unemployment benefits program via the
job-creation company, it will still maintain a long-run employment level where the marginal
product of the last worker equals the gross wage, so that the condition w f = ' determines
long-run employment. Since employment in the later years is therefore independent of
decisions made in the first years, the later years are not considered any further.
A further, more technical assumption will help to determine when the long–run
employment level will actually be reached. From the condition that the marginal product of
workers converges to zero when the number of workers approaches infinity,
lim '( ( ))
( ) B t f B t
ﬁ+¥ = 0, it follows that w f B t - '( ( )), the net burden on the municipal budget from
an additional worker, will never be greater than w. To reduce the analysis to three periods, it is
                                               
20 In practice, workers leaving the job-creation company voluntarily would have to be added, but these are
neglected in our theoretical analysis.
21 The objective of the municipality is to maximize the provision of the public good G, the price of which is
normalized to unity. Before providing the good, the municipality takes a make or buy decision. The cost-
efficient solution directly follows from the optimal employment level of the job-creation company.– 13 –
therefore assumed that the wage rate does not exceed double the expected savings, i.e.
w m £ 2 a.
22 The length of time before which the municipality has offered a job to all former
social assistance recipients is then restricted to three years. If the municipality only offered a
job to a recipient in the third year, this would lead to payments of 2m over the first two years.
If the municipality offered the job in the first year, however, this would cost it an expected
maximum of  [ ] )) 1 ( ( ' B f w - a  because it could always lay off the worker in the second period
in order that the worker would then receive transfers from the federal government. Hence,
since total costs are smaller than aw and by assumption, w m £ 2 a, total costs in the case
when the recipient is employed in the first year are always smaller than those when he or she is
employed in the third year. Therefore, the company will hire workers only in the first two years
and will reduce employment to the constant long-run level at the latest in the third year. For
the model this implies that  0 ) 3 ( = H .
3.4. The calculus of an individual municipality
These preliminary analytical considerations demonstrate that the calculus of a municipality can
be restricted to a period of three years. Leaving discounting aside, the municipality maximizes
the provision of the public good G over three years. As discussed above, it can choose the
number of persons to whom it offers a job in each year,  ) (t H , or whom it will lay off in each
year,  ) (t F :
[ ]
)) 3 ( ) 2 ( )) 3 ( ) 2 ( ) 1 ( ( (
)) 2 ( )) 2 ( ) 1 ( ( ( )) 1 ( (
) ( ) ( (
)) 3 ( ) 2 ( ) 1 ( ( )) 2 ( ) 1 ( ( )) 1 ( ( 3
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￿ (5)
                                               
22 As the Leipzig case study has shown, this assumption is not very restrictive. For  000 , 1 = m deutschmarks and
62 . 0 = a  the gross wage has to remain below 3,225 deutschmarks per month. Given that Leipzig offers a net
wage of 1,400 deutschmarks, this assumption seems very plausible. Even if the assumption is relaxed, only the
adjustment period would become longer without qualitatively changing the results of the paper. If, e.g.,
a £ m w 3  was assumed, it can be shown that it takes three years until all former social assistance recipients
are offered a job.– 14 –
The total amount of the public good provided in these three years depends on the surplus of
federal grants over expenditures on social assistance and the gross wages which have to be
paid to the employees of the job-creation company, as well as on the amount of the public
goods produced there. This maximization problem (5) is subject to various constraints. First, it
is impossible to lay off more workers in the second year than have been employed in the first
year:
0 ) 2 ( ) 1 ( ‡ - a F H . (6)
The term l1 indicates the shadow price associated with this condition.
Furthermore, it is impossible to lay off more workers in the third year than have been
employed in the second year:
0 ) 3 ( ) 2 ( )) 2 ( ) 1 ( ( ‡ - - + a F F H H . (7)
Finally, the number of social assistance recipients cannot become negative:
0 ) 2 ( ) 1 ( ‡ - - H H S .
23 (8)
The preliminary analytical considerations showed that all social assistance recipients will be
offered a job in the second year at the latest. Since H( ) 3 0 = , condition (8) is binding. Another
result of the preliminary analytical considerations was that employment will never fall below
the long-term level which is determined by the condition w f = '. Since in the third year,
employment can only be affected through dismissals, it follows that the local government has
no incentive to lay off all employees in the third year, which means that condition (7) is not
binding and l2 0 = . Therefore, the first order condition for an optimal level of employment in
the third year is
w f B = ' ( ( )) 3 . (9)
                                               
23 It is supposed that  0 ) 1 ( > - H S  because otherwise, the municipality would chose the same employment
level in the second year as in the first year.– 15 –
This result is not surprising, as it follows directly from the previous conclusion that all social
assistance recipients are offered a job in the first two years, and that it does not pay for the
municipality to let them go on working if it leads to net local costs.
24
In Figure 3, the curve w f - ' indicates the net costs of a worker in the job-creation
company, whereas the line m a shows the expected annual savings in social assistance
payments. Condition (9) establishes that the level of employment in the third year, B( ) 3 , equals
the long-term level of employment B( ) ¥ .
Figure 3: Employment levels in the job-creation company
As jobs are offered in the first two years only, the question arises of how many of the aS social
assistance recipients who are willing to work will be hired in the first year and how many in the
second year. Employing a new recipient in the first year costs the municipality w f B - ' ( ( )) 1 .
Since the municipality can fire the recipient in the second period, no further costs are incurred.
The benefit arising from an additional person employed in the first year is equal to the expected
saving in social assistance payments in the first year, m a, plus the saving resulting from the
fact that the recipient would have to be employed in the second year if he or she was not
employed in the first. These savings are equal to the surplus of the gross wage over the
                                               
24 If necessary, the municipality might reach this employment level by offering jobs to the recipients of
unemployment benefits since this employment level is rewarding for pure profit reasons (cf. footnote 17).– 16 –
marginal product of the worker in the second year, w f B - ' ( ( )) 2 . No further costs are incurred
in the future, irrespective of whether the worker is laid off in the third year or is permanently
employed. In the former case, the federal government has to pay for the worker, while in the
latter case, the worker’s marginal product will just cover the gross wage he or she receives.
Hence, it pays for the municipality to reduce the number of employees in the first year, as long
as  )) 2 ( ( ' / )) 1 ( ( ' B f w m B f w - + a > - . The employment levels for the first two years are
therefore implicitly determined by the first order condition
)) 2 ( ( ' / )) 1 ( ( ' B f w m B f w - + a = - , (10)
and the conditon
S = (2) + (1) a B B , (11)
which follows directly from our preliminary analytical considerations. Because for a given
employment level in both periods, the advantage of hiring one additional worker in the first
year always exceeds the advantage of hiring the worker in the second year, the second-year
employment level in the job-creation company will be lower than that in the first year.
Furthermore, the employment level in the second year will always exceed the employment level
of third year because of the cost-shifting effect. Hence,
B B B B ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 2 3 > > = ¥ . (12)
It pays for the municipality to build up a high employment level at the beginning, in order to
shift as many local social assistance recipients as possible to the federal unemployment benefits
program. The levels of employment in the second and third year are then reduced, until finally
the long-term profit maximizing employment level is reached. However, it should be
emphasized that this does not imply that the job-creation company could be organized
privately, because the wages it pays to workers are well below the negotiated regulatory wages
which private enterprises have to pay.– 17 –
4. Local savings at federal expense
4.1. The effect on local budgets
What is the fiscal advantage to the municipality from these job-creation companies, compared
to the conventional system of social assistance in Germany? In the founding year of a job-
creation company, its costs may actually exceed those of the social assistance system, but in
later years they are clearly lower. In the long run, the municipality saves money by establishing
the job-creation company, as can be seen in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Fiscal effects of a local job-creation company
In the traditional welfare system, the municipality has to pay welfare benefits m to all S
recipients (=0E in Figure 4), equivalent to the area 0EFK. If the municipality decides to replace
welfare with workfare and run a job-creation company, in the long run 0B workers will be
employed in the company, whereas BD former social assistance recipients are shifted to the
federal unemployment benefits program through temporary employment contracts. This
procedure saves the municipality the amount BDGI. Furthermore, ( ) 1-a  social assistance– 18 –
recipients (=DE) give up their claim to welfare payments, saving the municipality an additional
amount DEFG. The remaining workers 0B do not cost the municipalities anything; on the
contrary, they create a fiscal surplus of AB0. Permanent annual savings from operating a job-
creation company instead of the traditional social assistance program therefore amount to
ABEFK, which is even more than total welfare payments mS  were previously.
However, this calculus is correct only if all other municipalities do not change their
behaviour. Since every individual one of the N identical municipalities will enjoy the same
advantage, they will all switch to workfare. While the effect of a single municipality on the
federal budget Z is negligible (for one deutschmark of expenditure shifted to the federal
government, a municipality's federal grant is cut by only 1 N ), the situation is different in a
Nash equilibrium in which every municipality owns a job-creation company. In this case, the
federal grant for each municipality is cut by the amount of the rise in federal unemployment
benefit payments, i.e. BDGI. Nevertheless, establishing the job-creation company pays off in
the long run since the annual net savings due to the selection effect is still DEFG and the
permanently employed former social assistance recipients 0B do not cause any further costs, so
that the municipality saves 0BIK. On the contrary, it earns a surplus amounting to AB0, so that
the overall savings effect, compared to the existing welfare system, is ABIK + DEFG.
4.2. The consequences of vertical fiscal externalities
The establishment of municipality-owned job-creation companies significantly reduces the
municipality’s social assistance expenditures. But this does not mean that the current German
system in which social assistance is paid by the municipalities and unemployment benefits and
unemployment assistance is paid by the federal government, leads local job-creation companies
to be operated to a fiscally optimal extent. The vertical fiscal externality generates an incentive
for the municipalities to shift too many social assistance recipients to the federal unemployment
benefits and assistance programs and keep too few social-assistance recipients in employment.
The reason for this is that part of the municipality's savings does not consist of real economic
savings, but rather of costs shifted from one public budget to another.– 19 –
If the municipalities not only had to pay for social assistance, but also – assuming that
their federal grant was adjusted accordingly – for unemployment assistance, their calculus
would be entirely different. In the first year, the municipality would employ additional workers
as long as their net marginal costs were equal to the expected savings in social assistance, so
that  a = - m t B f w )) ( ( ' . Since the municipality is also in charge of unemployment assistance,
it would not be able to avoid costs by shifting transfer payment responsibilities to the federal
government. The cost of a worker would be reduced only by the amount of the savings in
social assistance payments in the current year. If all workers are laid off after one year and new
social welfare recipients are offered the jobs, it will not take long before all social assistance
recipients who are not willing to work are sorted out. The total number of social assistance (or
unemployment assistance) recipients will thus be reduced to aS. After that transition period,
the long-run employment level will be reduced to B B 0 > ¥ ( ). As the local government has to
pay the socio-cultural subsistence income level in any case, it is now optimal for the
municipality to employ workers up to the level where the gross wage minus the marginal
product of the worker exactly equals the savings in social assistance payments m. The
remaining recipients of social assistance, who have not lost their entitlement because they
declared themselves willing to work if work was offered, number CD, and continue to receive
social assistance m.
As compared to a job-creation company in the current system, BC additional workers
would be employed. As they no longer receive social assistance payments, this creates savings
of BCHI. However, since for this group of workers gross wages do not exceed the marginal
product, additional costs BCH are caused by employing them. Nevertheless, in the (Nash)
equilibrium, there is a net improvement BHI as compared to the establishment of a job-creation
company in the current German system.– 20 –
5. Reforming social assistance
The comparison carried out in the preceding section shows clearly that the establishment of
job-creating companies can be considered as a first step in the reform of the social welfare
system. The models implemented in Leipzig and certain other German cities show a way in
which municipalities can save costs in the current system. The creation of job-creation
companies is therefore desirable. However, the vertical fiscal externality inherent in the existing
situation requires an additional reform of the current German system of social welfare in which
competition in social insurance services between different jurisdictions still prevails. As long as
individual municipalities can improve their budgets by shifting the burden to the federal
government, less workfare is offered in the long run than would be desirable on grounds of
fiscal efficiency. Accordingly, too many claimants remain in the traditional system of
unemployment and social assistance, which rewards leisure instead of work (cf. Sinn 1998, p.
53) and destroys a considerable amount of human capital. It is thus necessary to reform the
social welfare system in Germany in such a way as to internalize the external effects of local
government decisions on the federal government.
Proposals which suggest that social assistance and unemployment assistance be
integrated and administered by a single institution point in the right direction.
25 This would
reduce the competition among social insurance services, but would not terminate it entirely.
Municipalities would still be able to shift their burden at least temporarily to the Bundesanstalt
für Arbeit, the government agency responsible for unemployment insurance which pays
benefits during the first year of unemployment. In addition, the problem of establishing a link
between the delegation of tasks on the one hand and appropriate grants of funds on the other
has not yet been solved (see Wieland 1996). A strict application of the principle of connexity
would destroy any incentive on the part of the municipality to save costs in social and
                                               
25 See the suggestions by the Christian Democrats who want to assign this task to the municipalities, the
suggestions of the Deutscher Städtetag to expand the tasks assigned to the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, and the
suggestions of the Social Democrats who advocate a closer collaboration between local and federal level
agencies (see Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung dated April 22, 1998, p. 20; Die Welt dated July 9, 1998, p. 2;
SPD-Programm für die Bundestagswahl 1998, S. 27).– 21 –
unemployment assistance programs. It would then be in the sole interest of the federal
government to promote the foundation of job-creation companies.
Whenever tasks are delegated to subordinate jurisdictions in the spirit of subsidiarity, it
must be guaranteed that subordinate jurisdictions act in the interest of the principal jurisdiction.
The increase in social assistance expenditures has forced municipalities to take action on their
own. By beginning to replace welfare programs by workfare programs, German municipalities
have taken an important step in the direction of a more economical use of scarce public funds.
But the fiscal externality involved in the current system requires an additional fundamental
reform of transfers to the unemployed, if the aim is to ensure a subsistence level of income in
as cost-efficient a way as possible.– 22 –
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